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Abstract
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) have emerged as key tools for building and assessing long
term climate mitigation scenarios. Due to their central role in the recent IPCC assessments, and
international climate policy analyses more generally, and the high uncertainties related to future
projections, IAMs have been critically assessed by scholars from different fields receiving various
critiques ranging from adequacy of their methods to how their results are used and communicated.
Although IAMs are conceptually diverse and evolved in very different directions, they tend to be
criticised under the umbrella of ‘IAMs’. Here we first briefly summarise the IAM landscape and
how models differ from each other. We then proceed to discuss six prominent critiques emerging
from the recent literature, reflect and respond to them in the light of IAM diversity and ongoing
work and suggest ways forward. The six critiques relate to (a) representation of heterogeneous
actors in the models, (b) modelling of technology diffusion and dynamics, (c) representation of
capital markets, (d) energy-economy feedbacks, (e) policy scenarios, and (f) interpretation and use
of model results.
1. Introduction
Climate change is widely considered to be one of
the key, global problems urgently in need of solu-
tions. Examples of recent plans and commitments
to address the problem include the European Green
Deal (EC 2019) with the 2050 climate neutrality tar-
get, China’s recent pledge to reach carbon neutrality
by 2060 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China 2020) and UK’s law on reaching
carbon neutrality by 2050 (UK Government 2019).
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are central
tools for providing insights about the options avail-
able for, and the consequences of, possible strategies
for long term greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduc-
tions, by simultaneously capturing the development
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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of several interacting, relevant systems (e.g. energy,
economy, land use). Analyses based on such mod-
els play a central role in the discussion of mitiga-
tion alternatives, implications and determinants of
specific actions and their consequences (e.g. CCC
2008, IPCC 2018, UNEP 2019). The influence of the
models therefore goes much beyond the academic
environment.
Partially due to the central role thesemodels hold,
there is a concern in the literature over how the cap-
abilities of, and recommendations from, these mod-
els map to the mitigation activities in the real world
(e.g. Larkin et al 2018, Anderson and Jewell 2019).
These models are attempts to capture the key ele-
ments of real-world systems, but, as we will discuss in
this paper, questions have been raised about whether
they are in their current state able to do so.
Additionally, this prominent role and the per-
ceived gaps in model capabilities have raised ques-
tions about the way in which model results should
be interpreted, used and communicated and to what
extent the discussion over long term mitigation
strategies should rely on conclusions drawn from
these tools (see section 3.6 on Model use and inter-
pretation). Models are always abstractions of real-
ity, i.e. ‘map is not the territory’ (Korzybski 1931),
which suggests that the translation process can be
non-trivial. And yet, while allmodels arewrong, some
are useful.
In this paper, we will summarise and discuss six
prominent critiques from the literature and reflect
the use and capabilities of diverse IAMs against those
critiques. In the process, we will also summarise the
key characteristics of the various IAMs and illustrate
their heterogeneity in methods and capabilities for
capturing various elements. We will further suggest
next steps for improving the performance and com-
munication of IAMs to the broader climate change
community.
2. IAMs of climate change mitigation
IAMs provide a quantitative description of key pro-
cesses in the human and earth systems, including
the interactions of such processes and systems. Their
analytical framework integrates elements from vari-
ous disciplines such as engineering, economics, cli-
mate, and land use. Most IAMs are global in scope,
although also, e.g. regional and national IAMs are
being developed (Schaeffer et al 2020). IAMs typic-
ally aim to have sufficient coverage of human sources
of GHG emissions so they can project anthropogenic
emissions over long periods of time, typically to 2050
or 2100. IAMs are utilised for exploring ‘the solu-
tion space’ by describing a range of possible pathways
that achieve long-term policy goals, such as global cli-
mate objectives, and at the same time highlighting
feedbacks and trade-offs between choices about the
energy system, economy and the environment.
The term ‘IAM’ is used to describe a range of
models that work differently, may differ in terms of
their system boundaries, level of detail and, generally,
were designed to answer different questions (Krey
et al 2019). Detailed process-based, activity focused
IAMs have, for example, traditionally been different
from cost-benefit IAMs which aggregate these pro-
cesses into stylised abatement cost and climate dam-
age relationships (Weyant 2017). Recently, however,
these modelling families have been moving closer to
each other (e.g. Dennig et al 2015, Takakura et al 2017,
Dellink et al 2019,Matsumoto 2019, Van Ruijven et al
2019). This paper focuses on the global process-based
IAMs and their use for assessing global mitigation
goals and decarbonisation pathways.
Process-based IAMs have evolved to answer dif-
ferent questions, and have therefore developed differ-
ent aspects of the energy-economy-climate-land sys-
tems and their interactions. For instance, the IAMs
which started as economic models still have their rel-
ative strengths in the representation of the economy
(‘Economic coverage’ in table 1. See also section 3.4).
Some other IAMs core strength is a very detailed
energy system, making them more suited for ana-
lysing different technological options for decarbon-
ising energy supply (‘Technology representation’ in
table 1. See also section 3.2). The way IAMs ‘solve’
over the decision horizon can also vary from model
to model (‘Solution method’ in table 1). Some IAMs
try to maximise welfare or minimise costs over
time (‘optimise’). Other models project based on
the trends and dependencies observed in historical
time series (‘simulate’). Models do this in time steps,
which usually vary from 1 to 10 years. In some mod-
els, minimising costs simultaneously across all time
periods (intertemporal optimisation) assumes ‘per-
fect foresight’, meaning that the ‘agent’ knows with
full certainty what is available, and required, in the
future. Although decisions in the real world are not
made with complete knowledge about the future,
exploring cost-optimal pathways can help identify
and describe efficient ways to achieve a climate target.
Other IAMs work ‘myopically’ (recursive-dynamic
models), meaning a time step is solved without full
knowledge of what comes after, making it possible to
explore today’s choices which may lock in infrastruc-
ture and raise the cost of climate action later. Finally,
simulation models differ from optimisation models
in that instead of identifying ‘optimal’ decisions, they
simulate, based on observed or assumed relationships
between variables, how the system might develop
going forward. This difference implies different inter-
pretations for the heterogeneity and decision mak-
ing of the agents represented in the model—and for
the interpretation of the model results more gener-
ally. For example, simulationmodels, such as IMAGE,
reflect in their parametrisation the real-world het-
erogeneity of agents and their implied, heterogen-
eous preferences (e.g. lowest cost technology does not
2
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capture 100% market share, even if this was other-
wise feasible), whereas cost-driven linear optimisa-
tion models, e.g. like TIAM–UCL, generally assume
a single representative agent, with a single set of pref-
erences, and would thus suggest that the technology
best matching these preferences is the best option for
everyone represented by this agent (see also sections
3.1 and 3.6).
Table 1 illustrates some of the dimensions across
which IAMs can differ, using as an example the mod-
els the authors of this paper operate and focusing on
the areas discussed later in this paper. Models with
a detailed description of the energy system at their
core (‘Technology detail’. See also section 3.2), for
example, tend to include a wider and more gran-
ular range of technologies than models that have
their focus and origins elsewhere, such as in the
description of the economic system. As seen from
the table, representation of technological change can
also vary. For instance, technologies can be represen-
ted either as having constant technical characterist-
ics and costs over the time horizon or with endogen-
ously changing costs and/or efficiency over time (Krey
et al 2019). Also, the assumptions about dynamic
technology characteristics and costs may be exo-
genous projections or driven by endogenous learn-
ing formulations depending on the deployment of
technology (learning by doing) and sometimes also
on R&D investments (learning by research). Endo-
genous formulations for technological change may
also be implemented throughout the model or only
for key sectors and technologies. Similarly, various
approaches exist for capturing how novel techno-
logies diffuse in the system (e.g. hard constraints,
adjustment costs, logit formulations, evolutionary
formulations).
Socio-economic and political dimensions, such as
economic growth and behavioural change, are key
determinants of how energy and natural resources are
used in the future. IAMs differ widely in how these
dimensions are represented, both in terms of which
elements are modelled and, for the elements that are
modelled, how the modelling is done. For instance,
capturing decision making in a model is influenced
by several factors, such as heterogeneity of modelled
actors, how they make decisions—and how granular
the description is. How this is implemented in spe-
cific IAMs depends on the model and the questions
it was built for (see section 3.1). For instance, IAMs
that assume an economically rational social planner
will often simulate non-rationality and heterogeneity
through exogenous constraints, e.g. minimum mar-
ket shares for technologies in a given sector.
IAMs also vary in terms of their representation
of the economy. As depicted in table 1, IAMs range
from partial equilibrium energy—land models (in
which the economy is exogenous) to computable
general equilibrium models of the global economy,
which endogenously capture the interactions between
energy, land and the environment with the overall
economy. This representation will shape how mod-
els represent energy-economy relationships and feed-
backs, as discussed further in section 3.4, and also fin-
ance, as discussed in section 3.3. IAMs also differ in
terms of their capability to represent specific policies.
In table 1 we score IAMs as low, medium, high
representation of policies, depending on the num-
ber of policies they can implement (based on IAMC
2020).
Given the long time horizon and simplifications
needed in order to capture the various complex sys-
tems in models, pathways suggested by IAMs are gen-
erally not meant to be normative, nor provide a blue-
print for policy makers (see also section 3.6). It is
also important to keep in mind the multitude of
modelling approaches that are captured under the
term ‘integrated assessmentmodel’, even when focus-
ing only on process-based IAMs. The models have
been originally created for different core purposes
and these are reflected in their structures, level of
detail for specific parts of the model and capabilities
for capturing various processes. This means that not
all models will be equally suited for answering spe-
cific questions, as their strengths and weaknesses dif-
fer. This, however, also means that a combined port-
folio of IAMs is likely to be stronger than any single
model.
3. Critiques, responses, and suggestions
for future research
We will, in this section, discuss six prominent areas
of IAM critique, that emerge from our assessment
of the literature. The referenced articles have been
chosen based on our collective expertise of the liter-
ature critical of IAMs, with no further constraints on
the nature of the critique, and these six broad areas of
critique arise from this review process. We see these
topic areas as timely and central, but we note also that
the nature of our review is a narrative one, whereas
a different approach of a systematic review using a
specific set of search terms could identify additional,
or different, areas of critique. Finally, the modelling
community is naturally also aware of a range of addi-
tional areas in which the models and model-based
assessment could be improved, e.g. harmonisation of
assumptions for model comparison exercises, more
frequent ex-post studies of model results and further
focus on uncertainty. These areas are not part of this
review.
3.1. Representation of heterogeneity within and
across actor groups
IAMs have been criticised for neglecting actor het-
erogeneity, which plays an important role in soci-
etal transitions. Modelling the complexity of soci-
etal transitions involves representing mechanisms
that lead to heterogeneous behaviour (e.g. norms,
5
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conventions, conflict, negotiation, strategic beha-
viour, resistance to change), local initiatives (local
heterogeneity), actor interactions, and the evolving
system level structures, including social and political
processes, governance and institutions (Trutnevyte
et al 2019). The latter is itself also subject to hetero-
geneous decision-making impacted, e.g. by normat-
ive objectives of policy makers. The heterogeneity in
different parts of the system leads to important inter-
actions within and between actor groups that can lead
to a societal transition. The models, however, are said
to remain in the paradigm of a single representative
agent (Mercure et al 2016, Balint et al 2017), with
economically rational, optimizing decision-making
based on perfect foresight (DeCanio, 1997, 2003,
DeCanio et al, 2001, Laitner et al 2003, Geels et al
2016, Trutnevyte 2016). The realism of decision-
making as represented in the models is questioned
(Van Sluisveld et al 2016, McCollum et al 2017, Hirt
et al 2020) and hence the model results may overlook
effective policies and other levers for climate mitiga-
tion (Trutnevyte et al 2020). The diversity across actor
groups is said to be limited to aggregate producers,
consumers and a fully informed benevolent social
planner implementing policies (Köhler et al 2018.
See also Czupryna et al 2020), and therefore those
social processes emerging from coordinated actions
of few actors (lifestyle change, innovation, strategic
actions, political processes) (Holtz et al 2015), are
hard to capture in IAMs (McDowall and Geels 2017).
Relatedly, it has also been highlighted that few IAMs
represent inequality (Rao et al 2017) as well as social
and distributional impacts (Böhringer and Löschel
2006).
The brief literature summary shows that actor
heterogeneity is connected to societal transitions.
Therefore, in our response to the raised critiques, we
make an attempt to simultaneously disentangle the
different roles that heterogeneity plays, while address-
ing them. Modelling heterogeneity inherently means
representing the individual parts of something that
initially is treated as a whole. This can be applied at
different scales, for example, from the population as
a whole to different social groups, or from regional to
neighbourhood level down to the individuals. Ulti-
mately this means including more details in IAMs.
Within longer time horizons and scope, specificity
does not imply greater accuracy as uncertainties
increase. The challenge lies therefore in modelling
clear and simple relations that capture the com-
plexity but do not overly constrain it (Dowlatabadi
1995). A key question that the modeler will need to
ask her or himself is therefore what details need to
be included in order to capture the overall system
behaviour.
There are two important situations when the
degree and type of heterogeneity is important to
include. The two situations are to a certain extent
in opposition to each other, illustrating how the
required level of heterogeneity in models will always
be based on a case by case approach.
In the first case behaviour is uncoordinated
and differs across agents, leading different actors to
respond to context and policy incentives differently
and be affected differently. A modeler wants to add
heterogeneity to evaluate specific detailed policies
targeting different groups or inequality, ultimately
because the aggregate effect is significantly differ-
ent from using a mean representative agent (e.g.
see Mercure and Lam 2015). IAMs come, as noted,
in different shapes and sizes but there are multiple
examples of studieswhere heterogeneity is introduced
for this purpose in different frameworks. Ekholm et al
(2010) and Daioglou et al (2012) for example both
use bottom-up modelling frameworks and model
households with different income levels in develop-
ing regions, showing that climate policy can reduce
residential GHG emissions, but prevents for lower
income classes a transition from traditional biofuels
to clean fuels. Dagnachew (2018) demonstrates how
increased electricity prices as a result of climate policy
can impact the low income classes in sub-Saharan
Africa. In amulti-model studyMcCollum et al (2018)
show the importance of a diverse set of policy meas-
ures targeting vehicle buyers, whenmodelling hetero-
geneous non-financial consumer preferences towards
alternative propulsion vehicles. So far, the research
has focused more on consumer heterogeneity, than
heterogeneity of businesses, governance and institu-
tions. Identifying and developing the key areas in
which the inclusion of heterogeneity is likely to sig-
nificantly change the conclusions drawn from the
models is an ongoing activity in the community and
should be continued.
In the second case behaviour is coordinated and
similar, and actors follow each other’s behaviour
or repeat their own behaviour. A modeler is inter-
ested in this coordinated response when interactions,
spill-over and feedback effects between actors could
lead to significantly different outcomes than if a
single representative agent was used (e.g. see Mer-
cure 2018). Key examples here are inertia, learning
and social influence effects.While most IAMs address
these system behaviours implicitly, through learn-
ing rates, diffusion constraints or enablers (see also
‘Technology representation’ in table 1), there are also
examples of models, or model variants, that explicitly
represent the interaction effects between individual
agents. Edelenbosch et al (2018) represent different
adopter groups to assess the reinforcing dynamics
between social and technical learning in a transition
towards electric mobility. Sachs et al (2019) describe
household agents in the MUSE model with vary-
ing objectives, where technology choice is influenced
by choices made by other agents. Also the E3ME-
FTT-GENIE model separates agents at the sectoral
level allowing to represent multi-agent influence,
behavioural biases (Thaler 2016) and innovation
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diffusion (Mercure et al 2018a, Knobloch et al 2019),
while the PRIMES-Builmomodel representsmultiple
agents in the buildings sector enabling the assessment
of distributional impacts of climate policies across
income classes (Fotiou et al 2019). While there is no
strict rule in terms of the IAM type that can best
consider explicit modelling of such interactions and
their consequences, in practise optimisation models
(as opposed to simulation models) are likely to be
more heavily tied to a single, global decision-making
rule with system behaviour addressed implicitly. It is
worth noting, however, that there is essentially nearly
infinite granularity for actor interactions in the real
world and thus themodels that do try to capture some
of this explicitly focus on doing so for chosen, very
specific mechanisms only.
Arguably investment decisions made in the pro-
ducing sectors may be more economically rational
than those of consumers and policy choice, where
many factors beyond financial considerations play
a role. The question here is whether, and to what
extent, these factors need to be explicitly included in
the models to represent the behaviour at the system
level. Many models have different stylised features
to reflect these beyond cost considerations impact-
ing the choices made. Examples are the use of a mul-
tinomial logit equation to depict market heterogen-
eity (e.g. IMAGE in table 1), risk or hurdle rates to
reflect the attitudes that people hold towards risks
(e.g. TIAM-UCL), and preferences for certain choice
feature example speed or affluence (Girod et al 2012,
Daly et al 2014). Reflecting such elements in assump-
tions embedded, for example, in the parameterisation
of the models is, however, by nature less transparent
than explicit inclusion in themodels, unless a concen-
trated effort is taken to communicate and document
the underlying implications clearly (Trutnevyte et al
2019).
3.2. Technology diffusion and dynamics
IAMs have been criticised over how they capture
the diffusion of technologies, and the processes that
determine the speed and shape of these transitions
(Anderson and Jewell 2019, Köhler et al 2019). For
example, co-evolution of technologies andwider con-
texts in which the technologies exist play a role
in technology diffusion, but is generally not expli-
citly considered in the models, leading to diffi-
culties for directly capturing the drivers of path
dependencies, innovation, market drivers and inertia
(Fouquet and Pearson 2012, Geels et al 2016, Hirt
et al 2020). Additionally, authors have argued that,
irrespective of how IAMs capture the details of dif-
fusion processes, their outcomes for key technolo-
gies are at times too optimistic (e.g. Hultman and
Koomey 2007, Fleiter et al 2011, Anderson and
Peters 2016, Anderson and Jewel 2019; Gambhir
et al 2019) and sometimes too pessimistic (Wilson
et al 2013, Fuhrman et al 2019). The ability of the
models to adequately capture endogenous techno-
logical change (Azar and Dowlatabadi 1999, Grubb
et al 2002, Löschel 2002, Mercure et al 2019, Varti-
ainen et al 2019), region specific technology policies
(Creutzig et al 2017, Trutnevyte et al 2020) and
policies enabling deeper diffusion of low carbon tech-
nologies (Gambhir et al 2019) all affect the conclu-
sions drawn from the models, e.g. about costs of mit-
igation or the feasibility of a rapid diffusion of specific
technologies.
Technological learning has shaped energy trans-
itions in several ways (Grübler et al 1999, Fou-
quet 2010, Creutzig et al 2017), leading to reduc-
tion of costs, increase of efficiency, and the creation
of new services or functionalities. While some IAMs
endogenise learning curves (e.g. Krey et al 2019,
Mercure et al 2019. See also table 1), i.e. the costs
decrease as a function of cumulative installed capacity
(learning-by-doing) or cumulative R&D investments
(learning-by-research), other IAMs assume exogen-
ously defined cost trajectories (Rubin et al 2015, Krey
et al 2019), and some IAMs may use a combination
of both—endogenous for some technologies, exogen-
ous for others (Clarke et al 2008; see also section 2).
The solution method of the model (see table 1) plays
an important role in this: Models relying on linear
optimisation suffer a significant computational pen-
alty when endogenous learning is included and are
thusmore likely to rely on exogenous cost projections.
What is more, in reality technological change arises
from amultitude of human activities and few of these
drivers are explicitly represented in themodels.While
some of the more obvious feedbacks are included
in some models, e.g. improved efficiency over time
(included in practically all models), changes in input
prices for materials and labour (included in detailed
general equilibriummodels, e.g. CGE models), many
other factors—such as changes in the product or ser-
vice itself (re-design, standardisation of technology),
detailed technology-specific policies, spillovers from
sectors not covered in detail in the models—remain
generally exogenous.
Some of the critiques to IAMs concern the speed
at which technologies can be deployed, i.e. how
quickly can d a competitive technology be scaled up
and what does this depend on in the model. The real
world processes behind this are numerous and com-
plex and the speed can be influenced by energy and
climate policies (such as those for PV (Creutzig et al
2017)), but also by factors which are independent of
policies, e.g. niche markets (e.g. Fouquet 2016), tech-
nology characteristics, fit with the existing infrastruc-
ture and knowledge spillovers (Grant et al 2020) or,
public acceptance of PV (Creutzig et al 2017).
Historically, factors influencing patterns of
technological diffusion in IAMs have been mod-
elled by imposing exogenous constraints (input
assumptions), rather than the limits for the speed
of deployment being products of endogenously
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modelled processes (model result). Use of expan-
sion and decline constraints, in which the production
or investment in a given period depend on those
of the previous period (e.g. investments can grow
maximum 5% per year), is common, as can be seen
in table 1. Such constraints can be technology spe-
cific, or relate to a group of similar technologies.
Sometimes such constraints are extended to include
adjustment costs, which allow faster growth/decline,
with an additional cost (e.g. Keppo and Strubegger
2010). Use of multinomial logit function for determ-
ining market shares in simulation models, or capital
motion equations in macroeconomic tools, reflect
inertia for the investments and thus moderate the
growth away from the type of sudden ‘winner takes
it all’ outcomes that linear optimisation models can
demonstrate (if no explicit constraints are included).
Finally, technology diffusion is also a system char-
acteristic and thus assumptions about technology
substitutability and system integration requirements
affect both the speed and extent of market share
change.
There is an active literature assessing the plaus-
ibility of IAM outputs with respect to historically
observed diffusion dynamics and stylised facts (Van
Sluisveld et al 2015, Napp et al 2017, Van Ewijk
and McDowall 2020). On the system level, mod-
els generally do characterise the transitions in a way
that is qualitatively comparable to empirical evidence
(Wilson et al 2013, Van Sluisveld et al 2015), even
if sometimes too conservative (Creutzig et al 2017),
sometimes too optimistic (McDowall 2016). This rel-
atively good match between forward-looking model
results and historical transitions is naturally not evid-
ence for future transitions for specific technologies
necessarily following the past patterns—especially
when the drivers of faster versus slower historical dif-
fusions are generally abstracted out in themodels and
thus not explicitly represented.
There is an important body of IAM research
currently addressing the above described issues. For
instance, Mercure et al (2016) investigated alternative
modelling approaches based on complexity dynam-
ics and agent heterogeneity to represent techno-
logy adoption and diffusion. McCollum et al (2017)
improved the representation of heterogeneous con-
sumer groups, and thus adaptation of technologies,
with varying preferences for vehicle novelty, range,
refueling/recharging availability and variety. Edelen-
bosch et al (2018) proposed a new model formula-
tion to analyse how technological learning and social
learning interact to influence transition dynamics,
in this case for electric vehicles. Further research
to include a wider range of drivers behind dif-
ferent diffusion rates could be considered, even if
the diffusion processes themselves are not expli-
citly captured. Examples could include improving the
parameterization of the diffusion equations based on
empirical evidence (e.g. Jewell et al 2019, Wilson et al
2020) and more frequent updates of technology data
to keep up with costs and performance developments
(Grant et al 2020).
Even if some generalizable patterns can be extrac-
ted from empirical research and modelled, fully cap-
turing all that matters for technology diffusion and
dynamics is unlikely to be feasible in IAMs. The
exploration of future pathways involving disruptive
changes, i.e. changes which not necessarily follow the
pattern of past transitions, is possible though scen-
ario analyses (e.g. Grubler et al 2018). Similarly, diffu-
sion constraints in optimisation models should gen-
erally be seen as scenario-specific input assumptions
in the context of which the model results should be
discussed and interpreted. As a consequence, models
can provide insights on what the implications of vari-
ous diffusion assumptions may be for future trans-
itions, but they cannot provide insights into the limits
to the diffusion speeds themselves, i.e. what would be
needed (e.g. for infrastructures, supply chains, beha-
vioural change) to reach specific levels of deploy-
ment growth for a given technology. While many
other drivers of technology dynamics are import-
ant and would ideally be captured endogenously,
this would greatly expand the system boundaries
of the models, bringing with it various trade-offs
such as increased model complexity, loss of trans-
parency, increased uncertainty of results. Balancing
these trade-offs while improving IAMs’ capability to
represent transformative structural and technological
change remains a challenge for the IAM modelling
teams.
3.3. Representation of capital markets and finance
Analysing the finance of green investments and the
role of capital markets is a rather new strand in
climate economics research. Interest has been kick-
started by demand from policy-makers following
concerns expressed amongst central bankers and
the financial community in general. IAMs began
to deliver relevant insights and results about e.g.
adequacy of carbon pricing to cover the financing
needs of stringentmitigation (Bowen et al 2014), how
national institutions affect investment risk, cost of
financing and, as a consequence, the distribution of
mitigation costs (Iyer et al 2015, Sweerts et al 2019),
alternative model formulations for availability and
cost of finance (Mercure et al 2018a). Some of this
research have been criticised for not representing the
financial system and its interactions with low-carbon
investment and the real economy in an adequate way.
IAMs that are based on neoclassical economic
growth and general equilibrium models, in which
limited savings are allocated to borrowers by banks
and capital markets, face a problem that is known
as the Lucas Paradox (Lucas 1990)—the observa-
tion that capital does not flow from developed to
developing countries as standard economic theory of
perfect capital markets would suggest. Thus, under
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the assumption of perfect capital markets, simulated
capital flows are at odds with observed global pat-
terns. Most general equilibrium IAMs of this type
therefore avoid to explicitly represent capital trade
and current account imbalances—whereas partial
equilibrium models by default do not capture these
variables at all, as they do not depict the entire eco-
nomy. Given the role that capital trade has on for-
eign investments (including green investments), this
is considered to be a drawback of IAMs. Staub-
Kaminski et al (2014) indicate imperfect financial
markets as one of the real-world imperfections that
are not included in most IAMs but which are crucial
in assessing mitigation costs.
The inadequate treatment of the financial system
in IAMs can lead to a possible overestimation of
the ‘crowding-out’ effect of green investment on
investment in other parts of the economy (Pollitt
and Mercure 2017, Mercure et al 2018a). On the
other hand, assuming that there is no ‘crowding-
out’ and agents have access to unlimited low-
cost financial resources could also be misleading
(Mercure et al 2018a, Paroussos et al 2019). Ulti-
mately, the representation of the allocation of fin-
ancial resources in models has insufficient detail
while theory lacks consensus within the econom-
ics academic community and beyond the world
of IAMs.
Whether a rapid low-carbon transition affects
national income is a long-standing debate (Edenhofer
et al 2010, Clarke et al 2014). However, more recent
evidence and debates suggest that it may be finan-
cial stability that could be most affected by the trans-
ition, as financial risk is re-organised and re-allocated
between different types of activities (Mercure et al
2016, 2018b, Battiston et al 2017). This suggests
that scholars have been overlooking the systemic risk
aspect of the problem. The debate also touches on
whether a low-carbon transition actually creates new
sectors and occupations in the economy, while it des-
troys others, which, with higher innovation poten-
tial, can foster accelerated growth with concurrent
structural change. The latter is contingent on how we
understand finance to be allocated to borrowers in the
economy. If banks are understood as creators of fin-
ance, where loans are created first and savings arise as
a result, then the transition leads to sectoral growth
and structural change (see e.g. Lavoie 2014, McLeay
et al 2014).Otherwise, if banks are understood as
channels of transmission for limited savings to reach
borrowers, then the finance of low-carbon innova-
tion and technological change may lead to crowding-
out of resources in other productive sectors of the
economy (see Mercure et al 2018a, Paroussos et al
2020). Thus, how the availability of finance is treated
in IAMs is a key issue for interpreting their outcomes
from the macroeconomic standpoint (Capros et al
2014). At the same time, conceptual dissent over how
this actually works in reality hinders progress.
To improve the representation of capital mar-
kets in IAMs, models take one of two approaches,
depending whether they are based on supply-driven
or demand-led macroeconomic theoretical founda-
tions (Capros et al 1990). The inclusion of the fin-
ancial sector in CGE IAMs improves their simula-
tion properties by: (a) Allowing the introduction of
financing schemes regarding the repayment of loans,
which reduces the crowding-out effect in decarbon-
isation scenarios and more realistically represent the
transition. (b) Calculating detailed budgeting of debt
across years and agents’ disposable income, ensur-
ing a more realistic representation of finance sec-
tor (c) Considering the impact of debt accumula-
tion and debt sustainability in the ability of agents
to borrow through effects on interest rates (Parous-
sos et al 2020). In the demand-led macro-economic
approach, finance is created according to demand
and can lead to bubbles (Pollitt and Mercure 2018),
and the key improvement is adequately representing
the perception by financial institutions of the credit-
worthiness of borrowers, to identify where and when
banks may refuse to lend. Examples of recent work
for modelling finance in supply-driven macroeco-
nomics include Bachner et al (2019), who explored
determinants of the weighted average costs of cap-
italin Europe’s electricity sector, building on a CGE
model coupledwith electricitymodelling andParous-
sos et al (2019), who showed that the provision of
low-cost finance can effectively reduce investment
costs for decarbonisation enabling developing coun-
tries to take full advantage of technological diffusion
with positive economic impacts globally. Leimbach
and Bauer (2020) investigate potential market feed-
back mechanisms between climate policies, energy
sector transformation and capital markets and in
particular asks to which extent the representation
of capital market imperfection (based on debt con-
straints, risk premia on capital trade and savings
wedges that cover unobserved institutional condi-
tions) changes the global and regional costs of climate
change mitigation. Results show significant changes
of regional mitigation costs, while on the global
level, higher costs for financing the capital-intensive
transformation of the energy system and reduced
costs that result from lower baseline GHG emissions
under imperfect capital markets compensate each
other.
Future research regarding capital markets should
address in a more definitive way how the alloca-
tion of financial resources should be modelled, and
whether the creation of financial capital is crowded-
out and limited by savings, or whether financial cap-
ital and purchasing power are created by financial
institutions as they lend. Policy questions related to
this concern are whether a rapid energy transition
reduces macroeconomic activity overall or acceler-
ates activity but increases systemic risk and structural
change.
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3.4. Energy-economy feedbacks
IAMs have been criticised for the way they repres-
ent the economy. In particular, IAMs were criti-
cised for relying on first-best economic assumptions
of perfectly functioning markets omitting import-
ant aspects of real-world frictions with key implica-
tions for macroeconomic dynamics and hence least-
cost assessment (Victor 2015). In addition, IAMs
have been criticised for the way they capture energy–
economy relationships and feedbacks. As argued by
Hourcade et al (2006), IAMs based on ‘conventional
Top-Down’ models tend to lack an adequate rep-
resentation of technological flexibility and substitu-
tion possibilities and limits (for instance by using
constant elasticity of Substitution—CES—functions
for energy modeling which has been shown to fail
to match historically observed patterns in energy
transition dynamics (Kaya et al 2017)). Conversely,
IAMs based on ‘conventional Bottom-Up’ approach,
without additional macroeconomic modules, do not
represent the macro-economic feedbacks of differ-
ent energy transition pathways, e.g. through rebound
effects, investments and households’ expenditures
feedbacks on the economy. These effects can imply
changes in economic structure, productivity and
trade that would affect the rate, direction and dis-
tribution of economic growth. More recently, adding
an industrial ecology (i.e.) perspective, Pauliuk et al
(2017) state that IAMs ‘incoherently describe the life-
cycle impacts of technology’ with missing energy-
material-economy linkages related to installed capital
and infrastructures. Overall, the decoupling between
economic growth and energy use or emissions in IAM
scenarios are seen by some as unrealistic (Scrieciu
et al 2013, Spangenberg and Polotzek 2019, Nieto et al
2020), in particular for developing regions (Steckel
et al 2013). Finally, authors have pointed out the weak
representation of the demand side of the economy
(Rosen and Guenther 2015, 2016) with limited ‘gran-
ularity’ and ‘imbalanced analytic methods and struc-
tures’ (Lovins et al 2019), so that IAMs are not able
to capture energy efficiency dynamics and potential
adequately.
First of all, most IAMs do rely on conventional
economics either through optimal growth models
with perfect foresight or as recursive-dynamic CGE
models with limited market imperfections. However,
some IAMs also have long explored the implica-
tions of second-best formulations, while others oper-
ate out of equilibrium. For instance, Fragkos and
Paroussos (2018) use a CGE model to include equi-
librium unemployment to assess the employment
implications of renewables expansion in the EU, and
Guivarch et al (2011) use a CGE model to show
how labourmarket imperfections strongly impact the
cost of climate policies. Leimbach and Bauer (2020)
have done a corresponding exercise for capital mar-
ket imperfections using an optimal growth model.
Waisman et al (2012) explore the consequence of
technical inertia under imperfect foresight formitiga-
tion costs using aCGEmodel, andPollitt andMercure
(2018) show, using a macroeconometric demand-led
model, that mitigation can increase the speed of eco-
nomic growth if economic resources are not assumed
under full employment. Similarly, inefficient and
region-specific discount rates and risk premia have
been implemented in the GCAM model taking into
account real-world inefficiencies (Iyer et al 2015).
Beyond those experiments, it is difficult to state which
second best features should bemainstreamed in IAMs
in the absence of a unified theory of second best eco-
nomics. However, further studies should at least aim
at better reflecting the plurality of the visions of the
economy, including alternative growth paradigms as
in MEDEAS (D’Alessandro et al 2020).
Regarding energy-economy linkages, most IAMs
are now hybrid constructs, either energy system
linked to macroeconomic growth models (Bauer
et al 2008) or multi-sector CGE—or other economy-
wide—models with explicit technologies in key sec-
tors (Paroussos et al 2020). Except for partial equi-
librium models (e.g. TIAM–UCL and IMAGE, see
table 1), most IAMs are thus capable of capturing
somemacro-economic feedbacks of energy transition
pathways, but with contrasted degrees of sophist-
ication depending on the model. Multisector mod-
els based on an input–output (I–O) structure usu-
ally include a more comprehensive representation of
energy-economy relationships (Mercure et al 2019,
Paroussos et al 2019), whereas the energy system is
more simply linked to aggregated economic growth
in other models. Most ‘Top-down’ models have also
been improved to better capture technological flex-
ibility and substitution possibilities e.g. explicit tech-
nologies in CES production functions (Wing 2006),
model linking for specific purpose (Fujimori et al
2019a, Delzeit et al 2020) or as mainstreamed in the
IAM (Sassi et al 2010, Lanz and Rausch 2011).
From an industrial ecology perspective, IAMs
include only limited representation of the life-cycle
impacts of technology. Models with a macroeco-
nomic budget closure include at least an indirect rep-
resentation of the global supply chains of all capital
investment. In compact growth IAMs, capital invest-
ment, related to whatever technology or type of infra-
structure, only consists of a composite macroeco-
nomic good whereas multi-sector models include a
more consistent representation with inter-industry
flows and specific investment goods even if related
materials flows are only accounted for in monet-
ary units. Conversely, some partial equilibrium IAMs
(e.g. COFFEE and IMAGE, see table 1) can account
for material flows in physical units but miss the full
life-cycle linkages due to absence of macroeconomic
closure. Progress towards expanding IAMs with i.e.
features is an active research area (Pauliuk et al 2017)
with different possible routes including adding new
features to the models (e.g. adding an investment
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matrix to track more specific life-cycle linkages in a
CGE model (Dai et al 2016)) or by model linking
with IE models (multi-region input–output, life cycle
assessment, etc) such as Luderer et al (2019).
Likewise, IAMs capture adequately the ‘demand’
of clean energy technologies or products, but usu-
ally fail to represent the ‘upstream’ industrial implic-
ations of mitigation (Karkatsoulis et al 2016) and
the potential domestic industry effects that being a
global technology leader might bring about (De Cian
et al 2013) and thus their results for specific region-
s/countries can be misleading. Again, the inclusion
of multiple economic sectors in IAMs can improve
their simulation properties with regard to industrial,
trade and distributional impacts of climate policies,
as demonstrated with the enhanced CGE modelling
in (Paroussos et al 2019).
Overall, the decoupling between economic
growth and energy consumption/emissions envi-
sioned in climate stabilization scenarios is much
stronger than historically observed, and no absolute
lasting decoupling has been experienced so far at the
global level (Hickel and Kallis 2020), casting legitim-
ate doubts about the feasibility of long term decoup-
ling projections. Yet, it is also clear that the very
nature of the low carbon transformation is to divert
from the historical trend. An alternative simulation
model, emphasizing energy constraints and using a
system dynamics framework with input-output ana-
lysis, shows thatmeeting stringent climate targetsmay
only be feasible under a de-growth pathway (Nieto
et al 2020). However, this critique points to mech-
anisms that are, in fact, present in IAMs with endo-
genous economic growth, namely that the growth
is actually constrained by energy availability (Foure
et al 2020). Moreover, other aspects of the energy
life-cycle constraints are already taken into account
through capital investment and I–O relationships in
multi-sector IAMs similar as in stock-flow consistent
input–output or system dynamics models. Yet, this
topic deserves further future research, also in com-
bination with empirical estimates of growth impacts
due to the impacts from climate change (Burke et al
2015), which can similarly lead to disruptive growth
patterns (Hänsel et al 2020).
3.5. Scenarios of policy instruments and policy
making
A major critique about IAMs concerns cost-effective
climate change mitigation scenarios and the role of
carbon pricing frameworks. The critique addresses
various aspects of the political and socio-technical
feasibility of transition scenarios related to carbon
pricing. First, the effectiveness of carbon pricing is
questioned because it does not target the technology
transition process directly (Patt and Lilliestam 2018,
Rosenbloom et al 2020). Second, the focus on carbon
pricing does not capture interaction between policies
and technology innovation (Grubb et al 2002, Geels
et al 2017a, 2017b, Rosenbloom et al 2020). Third,
the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of carbon pri-
cing is questioned because IAM models often make
the idealised assumption over uniform carbonpricing
across GHGs, sectors, and countries, and over agent
response to the price signal (Hourcade and Gilotte
2000, Patt 2015). Fourth, the aim to achieve climate
change stabilization ignores trade-offs and synergies
with other societal targets such as the sustainable
development goals (SDGs) (Geels et al 2016). Finally,
the introduction of policies needs to consider in the
modelling the political process because actors play
active roles that feedback onto the policy framework
(Cherp et al 2018, Jewell and Cherp 2020, Pye et al
2020).
3.5.1. Effectiveness of carbon pricing
The critique about the effectiveness of carbon pricing
relates to the ability of this instrument to trigger tech-
nological transition dynamics, which is a key interest
of socio-technical energy transition (STET) research
(Patt and Lilliestam 2018, Rosenbloom et al 2020).
Cost-effectiveness analysis in optimisation IAMs, in
a first step, is agnostic to policy instruments, as
these tools are used to identify optimal mitigation
strategies, which satisfy the condition that abatement
measures are undertaken up to a certain level of mar-
ginal cost across all sectors, countries and GHG gases.
There are two different policy approaches to
implement the mitigation strategy. First, climate
policies address emissions and environmental out-
comes directly, e.g. via carbon pricing or emission
standards. These policies change the overall eco-
nomic landscape affecting the economic competit-
iveness and feasibility of investment and production
decisions across all technologies. Alternatively, energy
and sectorial policies aim to control the use and pro-
duction of selected technologies and activities directly
by subsidies, feed-in tariffs or technology mandates
that in turn affect emissions indirectly by comprom-
ising economic competitiveness and feasibility of
freely emitting technologies. Hence, the cost-effective
mitigation strategy could be implemented directly by
a comprehensive package investment programs and
energy efficiency programs or by implementing car-
bon pricing policies. There is a fundamental trade-off
between both approaches. Policies affecting emissions
directly (like carbon pricing) leave technology selec-
tion issues to decentralised decision makers, whereas
policies targeting technologies directly are uncertain
about the emission outcomes that are only affected
indirectly. From model comparison studies it is well
known that cap-and-trade systems lead to very dif-
ferent patterns of technology deployment and energy
use (Edenhofer et al 2010. Kriegler et al 2014, Bauer
et al 2017). However, technology oriented policies
imply different emissions and can lead to rebound
and leakage effects that would require additional
policies (Böhringer et al 2012, Bauer et al 2015, Otto
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et al 2015). Energy related policies must assume a
very high level of information about the system at
the level of policy makers, whereas the information
requirements using carbon pricing policies is sub-
stantially lower. Up to our knowledge, a selection
and prioritization of what technologies should be
supported—when, by howmuch andwhere—has not
been presented in the STET literature. This would
require very detailed information about technolo-
gies, interacting systems and behavior, if an envir-
onmental target shall be achieved. Although scen-
arios derived with IAMs could form the basis for
such strategy, the STET community has not taken
advantage of it.
3.5.2. Policy mixes and innovation
The critique on policy mixes and innovation questions
the use of carbon pricing as the dominant instru-
ment to trigger transitions and technological change.
It is granted that carbon pricing mechanisms per se
are not empirically known as a key factor promot-
ing the development of new technologies in the early
phases of innovation. (Grubb et al 2002, Geels et al
2017a, Rosenbloom et al 2020). Carbon pricing can
drive and direct technological change by affecting
behaviour, but usually does not fully internalise the
positive effects of spillovers. Intra-temporal spillovers
relate to knowledge transfers and information pool-
ing, whereas inter-temporal spillovers materialise
through research and learning processes—basic fea-
tures in IAMs since the 1990s (Messner 1997, Kyp-
reos and Bahn 2003, Manne and Barreto 2004, Eden-
hofer et al 2005). Spillovers are in turn a reason
for additional public policies to address them and,
thus, overcome additional scarcities caused by car-
bon pricing (Goulder et al, 2000, Kverndokk et al,
2007). A particular issue with IAM analysis, that is
not often discussed, is that spillovers can be implicitly
solved, without representing the policies explicitly.
For instance, IAMs with endogenous technological
change (see ‘Technological change’ in table 1) derive
a social and intertemporal optimal solution assum-
ing implicit support policies that optimally intern-
alise intra- and inter-temporal spillovers (Hedenus
et al 2006, Schultes et al 2018). In this context, a
key methodological issue that has been much crit-
ised, but often not put into proper perspective is
the modeling assumption of perfect information and
foresight (e.g. DeCanio 1997, 2003, Fuso Nerini et al
2017). The assumption allows deriving the timing and
magnitude of technology specific support policies
based on intertemporal spillovers due to technolo-
gical learning, adjustment costs, etc. Assuming per-
fect foresight in IAMs moderates the support for
specific technologies depending on the strength of cli-
mate policies and the potential to supply clean energy
in the future. Suppose a technology is found to be
worth specific support to induce technology learning.
In that case, the support level should start relatively
high and decline as techno-economic performance
improves and less support is required to reach break-
even levels. Furthermore, technology support and
other regulatory policies can also be a temporary
substitute for carbon pricing if the institutional chal-
lenge to introduce comprehensive carbon pricing
schemes leads to substantial implementation delays
(Bauer et al 2012, Bertram et al 2015).
In this context, technology maturity assumptions
are frequently highlighted: The critique states the
necessity to study the technological innovation pro-
cess in a broader social and political context rather
than make assumptions on technology availability
(Geels et al 2017a, 2017b). For a comprehensive sys-
tems analysis this is a very demanding criterion.
Long-term projections about global energy systems
assume future technology development. If only cur-
rently status-quo technologies would be allowed,
energy use could hardly be maintained at current
levels (Rogner 1997). Such a static technology land-
scape is not only very restrictive, but also difficult
to justify in light of past and ongoing technological
developments. The mitigation technologies most fre-
quently called into question are those relying on car-
bon capture and storage, particularly in combination
with bioenergy (Kemper 2015, Anderson and Peters
2016). The critique concerns technology maturity for
large-scale deployment and, therefore, scenarios with
high deployment fail a feasibility test. This critique,
however, misses the crucial point of many IAM ana-
lyses. Many IAM publications studying future tech-
nologies, test the sensitivity of technology availabil-
ity and techno-economic parameters to identify and
quantify the value of technology available and per-
formance (e.g. via RD&D, improving social accept-
ance). The sensitivity analysis approach, a standard
technique in IAM scenario analysis (e.g. Tavoni and
Van Der Zwaan 2011, Kriegler et al 2014), compares
scenarios with varying availability of technologies to
draw conclusions about the importance of matur-
ing and making socially acceptable certain technolo-
gies andmitigation options. To advancematurity and
deployment of technologies identify as key to achieve
environmental targets, specific polices and measures
are then discussed. As a result the same environemt-
natl target would be achieved with a lower carbon
price.
3.5.3. Uniform carbon pricing
The critique of uniform carbon pricing (Hourcade
and Gilotte 2000, Patt 2015) is not a model critique
but concerns the assumptions about policy scenarios
(Trutnevyte et al 2020). IAMs can incorporate prices
differentiated by time, regions, GHGs and emission
sources (e.g. see Mercure et al 2018a, 2017b, Bauer
et al 2020). The choice of coverage of carbon pri-
cing is inevitably a political decision by the mod-
eller. The level and differentiation can be chosen
to meet certain conditions that can include criteria
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of fairness, policy promotion mechanisms, existing
exemptions from regulations, etc. Actually, the solu-
tion with uniform carbon prices could be considered
as a case with multiple carbon prices that are adjusted
to meet the criterion of cost-minimisation in models
of perfect foresight to achieve an emission target. The
distributional burden of the policies can be adjusted
by transfers or emission permit distribution. The dis-
tributional criteria can also be achieved by differen-
tiating carbon prices (Bauer et al 2020). In models
with multiple market failures such as international
or intertemporal spillovers uniform carbon prices
might not be optimal (see above), but this motiv-
ates complementary policies rather than deviations
from uniform carbon prices. Carbon price differenti-
ation may cause additional risks because market dis-
tortions that have been suggested to lead to (a) leak-
age effects that undermine the effectiveness to reduce
total GHG emissions criteria (Böhringer et al 2012,
Arroyo-Currás et al, 2015, Otto et al 2015, Bauer et al
2020) and (b) drive environmental degradation that
undermine sustainability (Wise et al 2009, González-
Eguino et al 2017, Bauer et al 2020).
3.5.4. Trade-offs and synergies with other societal aims
The critique that climatemitigation scenarios derived
with IAMs ignore interactions with other SDGs (Geels
et al 2016) is unsubstantiated. IAMs have been used to
investigate synergies and trade-offs between climate
policies and non-climate objectives (e.g. Fragkos and
Paraussos, 2018, Paroussos et al 2019). In the energy
sector the most important contributions include
modern energy access, air pollution, water use, toxic-
ology, resource and material use, and energy depend-
ency. Regarding the land-use sector, the most prom-
inent contributions consider food price impacts and
hunger, deforestation and afforestation as well as
irrigation and fertilizer use. Moreover, IAMs have
been used to investigate the exemption of the land-
use sector for the consequences of reaching climate
change stabilization targets (i.e. carbon price differ-
entiation) as well as interactions of other policies
like forest protection or coal-phase out policies with
the achievability of climate targets (e.g. Bertram et al
2018, Rauner et al 2020).
3.5.5. Consideration of political processes
Finally, concerning the consideration of political pro-
cesses, IAM analyses inform about the impact of
policies and the achievability of societal targets. In
this context, policy makers are partners for commu-
nication about policies rather than the subject of the
investigation in policy processes, as often is the case in
socio-technical transitions analysis (Cherp et al 2018.
See also Jewell and Cherp 2020, Pye et al 2020). The
integration of policy process and opinion formation
about climate change into a dynamic model struc-
ture, however, can lead to outcomes that are difficult
to interpret. IAM research shows that such feedback
loops can lead to a dialectic pattern: weak policies in
the near-term cause huge climate impacts that induce
stronger policies later, whereas ambitious policies in
the near-term cause economic disruptions that sub-
stantially weaken longer-term policies (Janssen and
De Vries 1998). The modelling result is also problem-
atic and difficult to communicate to policy makers
because it says that near-term action shall be in
contradiction to the long-term target to provoke the
intended reaction in opinion formation. In a histor-
ical perspective political processes are reflexive and
respond to expectations about the future—including
those produced by models—and therefore efforts to
incorporate political feedbacks into models can only
ever be partial. However, IAMs do not aim at explain-
ing political processes historically, but to form the sci-
entific basis for rational policy making for the long-
term future.
3.6. The use and interpretation of model results
Modeller judgement has an important role in defin-
ing numerous details about how the system is mod-
elled (e.g. what technologies to include/exclude),
but such subjective decisions, often driven by non-
epistemic values and norms, are rarely made explicit
(Schneider 1997, Beck and Krueger 2016, Anderson
and Jewell 2019, Haikola et al 2019), and the docu-
mentation process of IAMs and repeatability of IAM
analysis have been criticised (DeCarolis et al 2012,
Rosen 2015a, 2015b, Rosen and Guenther 2016).
Concerns have also been raised about how policy-
maker demands for analysis may shape modelling
choices and to what extent this is legitimate (Beck and
Mahony 2017, Low and Schäfer 2020) or damaging
(Geden 2015). On the other hand, limited particip-
ation of stakeholders in the modelling processes has
also been highlighted (Doukas et al 2018, Low and
Schäfer 2020).
Another concern relates to how some issues are
more on the foreground than others and thus dis-
tort the discussions about what is important and
feasible (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019, Low and
Schäfer 2020). For example, technology cost and
availability have generally been a more prominent
theme than equity (Anderson 2015, Anderson and
Peters 2016, Klinsky and Winkler 2018) and issues
of political or social feasibility are often of secondary
focus in IAM-based analyses (Vaughan and Gough
2016). Such biases can also affect the realism of the
scenarios (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019, Low and
Schäfer 2020) and scenario intercomparison project
induced group think (Cointe et al 2019) and reli-
ance on ‘common practise’ in the field (Ellenbeck
and Lilliestam 2019) can further strengthen these
dynamics.
Finally, the interpretation of the model results
is often ambiguous; do they really only explore the
possibility space (Low and Schäfer 2020), or do they
go beyond that and suggest real world responses to
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policies, or preferable pathways to follow? And if
the former, how is the full possibility space defined
(McCollum et al 2020. See also Craig et al 2002,
Trutnevyte et al 2016)? Critics argue that the inter-
pretation requires judgement that draws on non-
epistemic criteria (Beck and Krueger 2016), that the
mapping from ‘model land’ to the real world does not
get the attention it deserves (Thompson and Smith
2019) and that sometimes modellers do not appear
to agree on the appropriate approach to interpreta-
tion (Haikola et al 2019).
IAMs are large and complex, which creates prac-
tical difficulties for transparency and explicit doc-
umentation of the numerous choices made by the
modellers. There is much activity and discussion in
the community to improve transparency (e.g. How-
ells et al 2011, DeCarolis et al 2012, Cao et al 2016,
Pfenninger et al 2017, 2018, Huppmann et al 2019,
Krey et al 2019, IAMC 2020) and the direction of
travel is clear, but having, and transmitting, a full
understanding of the various choices made in the
modelling process is likely to remain a challenge.
For example, it would be challenging to high-
light and communicate for all technologies in a given
model, why some of them are considered separately,
but others are aggregated under broader categories,
what underlying assumptions drive specific numeric
values used for the parameters and so forth. While
this is commonly done for assumptions at the core
of a specific exercise (e.g. Bauer et al 2012, McCol-
lum et al 2014, Butnar et al 2020), results are greatly
affected also by the assumptions made elsewhere in
the models (see also Dodds et al 2015). What is
more, documentation is not always as helpful for non-
experts as one would hope, since the implications
of specific assumptions only become clear when one
understands the model well. Similarly, making code
and data publicly available is valuable, and teams are
increasingly doing this, but few people know how to
run and critique a model of this kind. With that said,
open sourcing can enable extended user groups and
with more expert users, there is a greater potential for
scrutiny and challenge.
Modellers respond to demand for analysis and in
the case of IAMs this demand is created by both sci-
entific and policy related drivers—and it is thus of
key importance that IAM teams provide analysis that
is, following (Cash et al 2003), ‘salient, credible and
legitimate’. Salience here is the policy relevance; prox-
imity to policymakers is required for modelling to
be salient, i.e. it needs to speak to the policy agenda.
Clearly, this is crucial: failure to be policy-relevant
undermines the goals of the modelling. However,
proximity to politics can sometimes risk undermin-
ing perceived credibility, i.e. scientific robustness, if
too many decisions are made for non-scientific reas-
ons (i.e. so that the results appeal to policy audi-
ences). IAM teams work closely with governments
but are not directly controlled by them. Most are
either academic units or in arms-length institutions
that are granted intellectual freedom. This helps to
balance the credibility dimension and the salience
dimension.
Following the above, IAM exercises are often
said to explore the possibility space but what is not
included within the boundaries of the space to be
explored cannot be found. The ‘map’ created by
modellers reveals and elevates mapped pathways in
the political arena; but it also leaves possibilities
unmapped. As discussed, those in positions of polit-
ical power influence which possibilities are mapped
by the modellers, the implication being that the
interests and perspectives of those that lack political
power may be overlooked—and there is perhaps a
need to counterbalance the resulting power bias of
scenarios with efforts to engage more diverse per-
spectives (e.g. Grubler et al 2018) and thus improve
the legitimacy of the analysis. The IAM community
should not overlook the value of exploring the
more marginalised perspectives, examining broader
ranges of issues or possibilities (as also advocated
by McCollum et al 2020). A tendency to reproduce
the perspectives of the powerful is not, of course, an
inherent feature of IAMs. Indeed, in the past energy
and environment modellers have often played an
important role in bringing onto the political agenda
issues or perspectives that were previously marginal,
such as the potential for renewable energy.
The challenge for IAM modellers is thus to stay
politically relevant, while also creating space for more
diverse voices and perspectives. This likely requires
expanding the range of interests engaged, ideally bey-
ond the typical range of expert stakeholder parti-
cipants in IAM workshops. Ultimately, if the scen-
arios and models overlook important perspectives,
the resulting knowledge will not be seen as legitim-
ate by some stakeholders—and as a result will be less
useful to policy (Cash et al 2003).
As for how the analysis of the results is focused,
traditionally attention has been especially paid to
costs and technologies, but this has also been central
for the users of the analysis (e.g. DTI 2003, EC 2007.
See also Taylor et al 2014) and thus not driven exclus-
ively by the modelling community itself. The discus-
sion has been recently changing, with more focus on
the wider impacts to the society, including how such
impacts are distributed, and this shows also in the
focus of the modelling and analysis (e.g. Jewell et al
2014, Van Vuuren et al 2015, Liu et al 2016, Bertram
et al 2018, Parkinson et al 2019, Fujimori et al 2019b,
2020, Taconet et al 2020). In that sense IAMs do not
generate the narratives about what is important and
what not, but do amplify them (for a different view on
this conclusion, see McLaren and Markusson 2020).
Model interpretation, mapping of meaning from
model results to the real world, has been a topic in
IAM/energy modelling at least since the early 80s
(Häfele 1981, Häfele and Rogner 1984, Keepin and
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Wynne 1984, Wynne 1984). This discussion often
combines issues related to model interpretation to
those of clear and consistent model communication,
i.e. what is the information and insights that can be
retrieved from the model analysis and is the com-
munication of results consistent with this. Better and
explicit recognition of what are the limits of what spe-
cific IAMs can say about particular topics could help,
but one would also need to ensure that the practise
is consistent with this; even when most models can,
in principle, provide results that appear to provide
insights for a specific question, the interpretation of
these answers is not uniform and some IAMs may be
entirely inappropriate for the specific question, e.g.
due to lack of sectoral coverage, and should thus not
contribute to the specific exercise. Thinking about an
‘interpretation phase’ as a discrete phase of work, as
is done in some other fields (e.g. Laurent et al 2020),
could help with this process and lead to more trans-
parency about how modellers themself interpret the
results. For example, do we understand our models
as ‘credible worlds’ and if so, how are we making
the inductive inferences from the ‘credible world’ of
‘model land’ to the real world (Sugden 2000)?
4. Concluding remarks
IAMs have played a central role for academic and
policy focused assessment of climate change and mit-
igation and, even with their shortcomings, there are
few alternatives that can provide what they provide:
Internally consistent, virtual laboratories of the com-
plex, interacting social, economic, technical and phys-
ical systems. The models cannot predict the future,
but without them the simultaneous consideration of
these systems and the rules governing them would
certainly be more difficult.
Our review and analysis of the literature critical
to IAMs in the six identified areas has highlighted
a number of critical items for future IAM develop-
ment and use. In modelling heterogeneity, a key con-
sideration is the trade-off between added complexity
and better representation of overall system beha-
viour. There are circumstances under which diver-
ging behaviours play an important role and identi-
fying these areas and developing the models further
to capture them better should be continued. At the
same time, elements that can be represented through
more aggregated formulation should not be unne-
cessarily complicated, but the underlying rationale
and assumptions should be clearly communicated.
For technology diffusion, it is unlikely that the mod-
els would ever be able to fully capture endogenously
the complex and numerous processes that determ-
ine technology dynamics. With that said, empirically
derived explanatory factors can add detail and robust-
ness to the formulations and a wider use of these ‘styl-
ised facts’ in model parametrisation could help better
reflect the differences across the technology options.
Modelling of capital markets, and crowding-out
effects in particular, is complicated not only by mod-
elling inadequacies, but also by the lack of consensus
in the broader economic theory on how creation of
finance should be understood. Progressing on this
would directly contribute also to how finance should
be modelled. In the meantime, supply-driven mac-
roeconomic tools can further improve their capabilit-
ies by explicit inclusion of financing schemes, detailed
budgeting of debt and linking interest rates to debt
accumulation and debt. A key area of development
for demand lead models is better representation of
how financial institution perceive the credit worthi-
ness of borrowers, and how this affects the allocation
of financial resources to them. Energy Economy feed-
back representation in IAMs has faced critiques espe-
cially for the so called ‘first best assumptions’. There
have been activities in this area, but it remains diffi-
cult to identify which specific ‘second best’ elements
would be essential to integrate in the models. With
that said, it would benefit the community to include
a broader range of visions for the economy, including
those that emerge from alternative paradigms. This
is especially true as often IAM scenarios show strong
decoupling of emissions and economic growth, which
has not been observed for sustained periods of time
on the global level.
Representation of policy instruments, and carbon
price in particular, in IAM scenarios does not directly
reflect model capabilities, but rather the way in which
themodels are used.We argue that while the critiques
do point out a range of valid concerns and useful
perspectives, there are clear trade-offs in construct-
ing the policy modelling radically differently and it is
unclear whether the alternative policy formulations
would increase the usefulness of the analysis. Inter-
pretation and use of model results has been an espe-
cially active area of critiques, as it often is the contact
point between IAM and non-modelling communit-
ies. While communication can be improved with the
continued efforts to increase transparency, this will
always be somewhat limited by the high complexity of
the tools and the particular expertise that is required
to understand what specific choices in the model-
ling mean for the interpretation of the results. Open-
sourcing of the tools does help in expanding the user
group, which can bring with added scrutiny of the
tools. Similarly, reflecting more diverse interests and
perspectives in the formulation of the scenario frame-
works, beyond those emerging from the position of
political power, can further increase the credibility
and legitimacy of the analysis. Finally, more atten-
tion should be given to the differences across the
IAMs, to how that affects the nuanced interpretation
ofresults and the questions for which the models are
appropriate
While the models have come a long way and are
constantly being improved, gaps remain, and always
will. Models are an abstraction of the real world and
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can never be expected to fully capture the latter. This
does not mean that they cannot be useful for under-
standing key dynamics of it better—or that they could
not be improved. In addition to technical model
improvements that address perceived shortcomings,
modellers should also further continue the efforts to
make the models more transparent and open to the
end users of model analysis. A key element in this is
also a better and more consistent communication of
how the model results should be interpreted and how
they can, and cannot, be used.
The richness of modelling approaches and areas
of focus is a strength for the community—the port-
folio of IAMs, when using specific models in appro-
priate contexts, provides a much stronger analytical
platform for long term climate change mitigation
analysis than any single model could. Collaborative
platforms, such as the Integrated Assessment Mod-
eling Consortium (IAMC,www.iamconsortium.org),
should provide an excellent tool for the community
to further communicate the strengths and weak-
nesses of various tools—and how they can further be
improved.
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